1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  SAN ANTONIO DIVISION		
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, .  EX REL, .		
5	AND PETER HUESEMAN, .		
6	PLAINTIFFS, . vs. DOCKET No. SA:14-CV-212-XR		
7	PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING . CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., .		
8	DEFENDANT.		
9	DETERMINATION •		
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11	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE XAVIER RODRIGUEZ		
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  JUNE 16, 2022		
13	OONE 10, 2022		
14			
15	APPEARANCES: FOR THE PLAINTIFF: JOHN DECK, ESQUIRE		
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9	REPORTED BY:	GIGI SIMCOX, RMR, CRR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
10		UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
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        (San Antonio, Texas; June 16, 2022, at 10:30 a.m., via
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    Zoom videoconference.)
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             THE COURT: Let's turn to 14 civil 212, U.S.A., ex
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    rel Hueseman versus Professional Compounding Centers of
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    America.
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             Who do we have for the plaintiff?
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             Do I have somebody?
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             (Crosstalk)
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             MR. GROSSENBACHER: Yes, Glenn Grossenbacher for
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    relator.
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             THE COURT: Thank you.
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             And do we have anybody from the government?
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             MR. DECK: Yeah. Sorry, Your Honor. I was on mute.
             This is John Deck for the United States. I'm also
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    joined by my colleagues, Sanjay Bhambhani, Nathan Green, and
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    Danielle (inaudible).
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             THE COURT: Thank you.
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             And for PCCA?
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             MR. BURBA: Yes, Your Honor. Tony Burba for PCCA.
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             And also joining on the call are my partners, Mike
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    Battle, David Frazee, and Alicia Barrs. We also have for
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    observation, representatives from our client, Mr. Marc DuPont
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    and Fabian Zaccardo.
             THE COURT: Thank you.
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             So we have this False Claims Act case, and I'll start
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I guess with the plaintiff, the relator and/or the government 1 2 to help me understand this, but as best I can figure out, PCCA 3 makes ingredients that they sell to pharmacies and then the pharmacies use these ingredients to make compound drugs. 5 And then when they make the compound drug they bill that to TRICARE, and when they bill that to TRICARE they have 6 7 to identify each of the ingredients in that compound 8 medication. And what they are doing there is billing to TRICARE the ingredients based upon an average wholesale price that PCCA gave them. 10 11 And the allegation is that — and I'll just make up 12 numbers, just for the sake of a hypothetical — they will bill 13 TRICARE \$100 for this ingredient, when PCCA only charged them 14 \$1. And of course, I'm just making up numbers here. 15 Do I have the theory of this case right? 16 I'll start with the relator. 17 MR. GROSSENBACHER: Yes, Your Honor, but I'll defer 18 to the government and concur with our arguments laid out in 19 the motion — response to the motion to dismiss. That's 20 exactly what the allegation is, as you described it. 21 THE COURT: And so if that's right then, and I'm 22 trying to understand PCCA's motion to dismiss, PCCA is giving 23 the pharmacy an AWP that it uses, and my understanding --24 someone correct me if I'm wrong -- when TRICARE receives that

bill, what they are doing is they are going to some third

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party, and I'm not sure where they go look at this, and they
look to see, okay, how much is the AWP. And PCCA is also
posting on that third site that number that's higher than what
the actual billing was.

Am I right on that?

And let me hear from the government.

MR. DECK: Right, Your Honor. You are right in your explanation.

What I would point out, although it's not terribly relevant is that PCCA doesn't actually manufacture these ingredients. As I understand it, they purchase them from third parties and then they repackage them and they sell them to their customers.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DECK: But you are right, they set the AWP and they send it to these pricing compendia that are, you know, standard pricing catalogs in the industry and the government will reimburse the drug on one of three metrics, whichever is lower, AWP, the price to the pharmacy, or the usual and customary price, which is basically what a cash purchaser would pay.

And the allegation here is that during the relevant period the government was paying the AWP, in part because PCCA customers, at PCCA's urging, were hiding their actual costs and then manipulating the usual and customary costs so that

the government would pay the AWP. 1 2 THE COURT: And what's the theory of the government? 3 How much money do you think was overpaid because of this 4 practice? 5 In the complaint we stated that the MR. DECK: 6 government overpaid hundreds of millions of dollars for PCCA's 7 ingredients alone. Although it's not pled in the complaint, 8 we think that number is a little like under a billion dollars total, for PCCA's ingredients alone. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 So let me turn to PCCA and let me allow you to make 12 any arguments you have on your motion to dismiss. 13 MR. BURBA: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 I would first say that if the government's position 15 is now that single damages are approaching a billion dollars, 16 that would be the first time that's been disclosed to us. I 17 think the single damages number that have been presented to us 18 have been substantially lower than that number. 19 Our position is that this is not an FCA case and we 20 don't think that there are any disputed facts that the Court 21 needs to resolve to make that determination. 22 This case targets a company that does no business 23 with the government, never has. A company that's never made 24 or sold anything that the government pays for.

They have never submitted any kind of claim for

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payment, directly or indirectly to the government. They have never had any kind of contractual relationship with the government.

They have never received payment from the government, and they are alleged to have reported to nongovernmental third parties AWPs that the government now says were inflated, despite the fact that the term "AWP" still remains undefined by the government, even in their most recent filing of their response or in their complaint.

The government says that the fraud is actionable under the False Claims Act, even though they don't allege that PCCA was subject to any of the regulatory or sub-regulatory guidance that they describe in the complaint. And the government doesn't even allege in their complaint that PCCA was aware of any of that guidance, and has now suggested in their response that they don't need to show that.

The government is essentially asking the Court to infer the existence of conduct subject to the False Claims Act because it says so. It's asking the Court to draw inferences in its favor based on little more than the use of the words "fraudulent" and "false" in the complaint.

In fact, under the law in this district, falsity requires an objective standard by which the Court and the parties can measure AWP. And the government points to no authority suggesting otherwise, other than a recent criminal

case under a different statute.

Moreover, the government points to no objective measure of AWP to which PCCA could have looked at the time that they are alleged to have committed the fraud, nor even any objective standard that we could look to now in defending ourselves.

The government seeks to coddle together legal support for its theory of materiality and falsity that's wholly inapposite. They talk about state Supreme Court cases and out-of-circuit cases that examine AWP, not in the context of materiality and the False Claims Act, but in the context of state laws, and in most cases, state consumer fraud laws. And those cases were all dealing with the issue of AWP prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Escobar.

By reading of the 2009 First Circuit opinion that the court — or that the government cites in their response, I think is instructive. In that case, the Court was not looking at materiality as defined under the state — or under the False Claims Act, even at that time.

It was rather examining AWP as it related to a state consumer fraud action. And in fact, that court held, and I will — and I can quote from that opinion, that this case — paraphrasing — this case does not involve any misrepresentations to Medicare.

So this case is not a False Claims Act case. It's a

theory in search of facts and law to support it, and the
government's essentially trying to convince the Court here
that the old hits are the best, but their case is just a cover
band and the old hits don't possess any magic to convert their
baseless claims into a False Claims Act case.

The conduct of TRICARE in this case obviates any proof of falsity, knowledge, causation, or materiality. The government is essentially looking to shift blame for an alleged loss that was caused by its own mistakes.

The government could have stopped the reimbursement of these claims for compounds based on AWP at any time, simply by following its own regulations. TRICARE has admitted in the GAO report attached to our motion to dismiss that it knew of these issues since at least July of 2012 and did nothing for three years.

Even after the government alleges that TRICARE took corrective action on May 1st of 2015, Exhibit 22 to the government's complaint shows that TRICARE kept making payments on claims which the government now takes issue with. Twelve of the government's 325 handpicked representative claims in Exhibit 22 postdate the alleged corrective action taken by TRICARE.

The Court should not allow the government to shift the blame for its own mistakes to a company that had no reason to believe it was beholden to the regulations that the

government itself was violating.

In closing, I would point the Court to the Escobar opinion, pages 195 and 196 in the Westlaw citation. We reference in our motion to dismiss and our reply that the government here, if its theory is to be accepted, is expanding the False Claims Act well beyond the boundaries intended by Congress, and well beyond the parameters that the court — the Supreme Court has set forth.

In Escobar, the government's theory of materiality was that any violation of any regulatory requirement that might allow the government to deny payment was material.

That rings of the government's argument here, which is that because the government chose to consider information outside the context of its own regulations and rely on that information, that somehow that information was material.

But Justice Thomas, in the *Escobar* opinion, expressed his concern about this theory and the breadth of it and that the government could, for instance, in its Medicare contracts could end a requirement that all providers use American-made staplers, and that the use of a foreign-made stapler, even though it's wholly irrelevant to the service the government is seeking, could cause substantial liability under the False Claims Act case.

Our position is that here the government is not going after providers who used a noncompliant stapler, they are

going after the stapler company, and we believe that their theory is well in excess of what the False Claims Act is contemplated to cover.

And in the absence of having identified any product controlled, sold, or otherwise relevant to PCCA's business, that the government has ever paid for, it also falls short of the requirements of the antikickback statute.

THE COURT: Well, I was going to turn to that. What of the antikickback?

I mean, the complaint is stating that you-all had your customers, these pharmacy companies, pay to belong to some kind of like a membership club, and the allegations in the complaint are you were telling your members/pharmacies not to be disclosing to TRICARE the actual amount you were charging them, and so these — I'll ask the government here in a little bit why we aren't going after the pharmacy companies, I agree with that comment, but you guys are receiving monies in exchange for this, so why isn't the complaint sufficient for the antikickback statute?

MR. BURBA: Well, I would suggest, Your Honor, that I personally have received a gift basket at Christmas from e-Discovery companies I use, but I don't think those e-Discovery companies would consider themselves covered by the False Claims Act just because they sent a lawyer who represents health care companies a basket.

1 And our position here is the issue of remuneration is 2 irrelevant because the products at issue do not fit within the 3 parameters of the antikickback statute. We don't sell 4 anything that would pull us into the antikickback statute. 5 We sell something that may be tangential to something that the government paid for, frankly something the government 6 7 paid for that it shouldn't have, but no pharmacy has ever 8 submitted a claim for PCCA's products. They have submitted claims for compounded medications — 10 THE COURT: Well, isn't that parsing things -- that 11 seems to be parsing things way too thin. Your ingredients are 12 going into the compound pharmaceutical, correct? 13 MR. BURBA: Correct. 14 THE COURT: Yeah. Let's hear from the government. 15 What's your response to all this? 16 MR. DECK: Your Honor, I'm not going to try to make a 17 point-by-point refutation of what Mr. Burba just said. 18 I think the complaint, which is nearly 50 pages, 19 sufficiently pleads all the claims here. And I think our 20 briefing, which was, you know, over 60 pages, went point by 21 point to say why PCCA is wrong in saying this case warrants 22 dismissal. 23 I do want to focus in on three arguments that PCCA 24 makes. The first is that TRICARE somehow didn't follow its 25 regulation because it supposedly didn't cover the ingredients.

To start, the allegations in the complaint, which the Court must accept as true at this point, contradicts its contention.

They allege that PCCA knew TRICARE reimbursed its customers. In fact, it sought to delay changes in TRICARE's policies so that the reimbursements would continue. And then once TRICARE stopped paying, this is alleged in the complaint too, its president lamented because its purchases — their customers' purchases declined quickly and sharply.

And regardless, none of the elements of the AKS or the FCA depend on TRICARE's coverage or authority to reimburse. And any negligence, or error, or mistake by the government can't justify PCCA's fraud.

The second argument is that PCCA contends that its AWP can't be false because there is no definition. This has been repeatedly rejected by courts. Mr. Burba cited the First Circuit opinion, which we also cite, and it says that the government use of AWP does not grant the pharmaceutical industry, quote, "unfettered discretion to report drug prices that bear no relation to products actual prices."

And what the Court was doing there is that they were affirming the trial court's finding that if AWPs in that case, for a cancer drug, were more than 30 percent above the acquisition cost for that drug, then they were false and inflated.

Here, we have AWPs that were inflated between 1300

and 56,000 percent. These AWPs were no relation to anything, except profits for PCCA and its customers. And the government contends are false by any measure.

The third and final argument I want to focus in on is this claim that the government continued to pay after it had knowledge of wrongdoing. Again, this is an incorrect assertion given the facts alleged which the Court must accept as true.

The government acted here when it had sufficient knowledge of fraud in November 2014, which is just eight months after the relator filed this lawsuit notifying the government of its allegations. The government acted to curtail payment by recommending a control, prior authorization for these claims.

Then in May 2015, after, you know, the required administrative processes, the government enacted these controls, and the number of claims declined sharply and PCCA's sells plummeted.

What PCCA appears to argue is that if the government generally knows about fraud, here AWP inflation, somewhere in the pharmaceutical industry, then that's sufficient notice and it precludes any prosecution.

Now, that position is absurd because the government knows about all sorts of fraud generally. If that was sufficient, then the government even couldn't use the FCA and

1 the AKS at all. 2 The position is also inconsistent with the law. What 3 Escobar says is that the government must have actual knowledge 4 that certain requirements were violated. General knowledge is 5 not enough. 6 And regardless, you know, knowledge and then 7 continued payment is only one nondispositive factor under 8 Escobar, and it only goes to one element of the FCA. 9 In Harman, the case from the Fifth Circuit, has said 10 that no factor, including government knowledge, is 11 dispositive. 12 Mr. Burba says that the government knew about, I 13 quess, the fraud, the specific fraud here, since July of 2015. 14 Now, the document he cites is the October 24 GOA report. I 15 think it's Exhibit 1 to their motion to dismiss. 16 Now, that document doesn't say that the government 17 knew about the inflation here. It says, quote, "Since 18 July 2012 TRICARE has continued to pay for compound drug 19 prescriptions containing bulk drug substances." That's not 20 saying the government knew about the fraud here. 21 Moreover, the document does not state that PCCA was 22 inflating the AWP, the extent of the inflation, or the

And even if the government knew about the inflation in October 2014, or even July 2012, the government here acted

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marketing of the spread.

in November of 2014 to stop payment. And as this Court has observed in the PVA case, quote, "Health care administration is complicated. The government does not enjoy the luxury of refusing to reimburse health care the moment it suspects there may be wrongdoing."

You know, TRICARE is a gigantic program. It ensures millions of people. Many of them are active military. The government can't just, at the drop of a hat, stop payment. And it's particularly rich for PCCA to be making this argument when it's alleged in the complaint that at the time that TRICARE is considering these changes, it was actively trying to stop TRICARE from making the changes.

What PCCA really disputes here is what the government knew and when it knew it. Now, if these are matters at all, they are matters of proof. They are not legal grounds for dismissal. So we think that all of PCCA's arguments fail and we think the motion should be dismissed in its entirety.

And I mean, I'll take any questions you have, Your Honor, on those issues or on anything else.

THE COURT: So let's act under the assumption that the motion to dismiss is denied. So I am curious about your calculations here and how we got to a billion dollars. This is probably for another day, but I want to tee this up so everybody is talking here amongst themselves if this is possible.

1 So you know, the individuals or the companies that 2 made most of this money off TRICARE seem to be the pharmacies. 3 So how is it that we are going under this theory that all that 4 amount of loss is attributable to this defendant? Under what 5 theory do you attribute the entirety of the loss to this 6 defendant? 7 MR. DECK: Well, I mean, under the AKS, any claim 8 tainted by a kickback is in the damages, like you get the 9 entire claim. 10 THE COURT: But is it that amount? 11 MR. DECK: And so --12 THE COURT: Is that amount calculated by how much it 13 received, not the total amounts paid? 14 MR. DECK: Yes. It's the entire claim. So it's the 15 entire claim paid by TRICARE. 16 Now, I think you're right that this discussion will 17 obviously go on throughout this case. There will be 18 discovery. There will be experts. There may be some sort of 19 discount on, you know, perhaps an expert will opine what a 20 reasonable discount would be between the AWP and the 21 acquisition price, and damages may end up at the end of the 22 day not being the entirety of the claim, but at this point I 23 think it's premature. 24 THE COURT: Yeah. No. So we are here on just the motion to dismiss, but I just, in the event that the motion to

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    dismiss fails and this case continues, while you're all here
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    on the line, I wanted to raise that subject.
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             And so while we're still all on the line, under the
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    assumption — this isn't a ruling yet, I'm going to take this
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    under advisement, but under the assumption that the motion to
    dismiss is denied, how do we go forward on discovery from the
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    government/relator standpoint?
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             MR. DECK: I'm going to let my colleague,
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   Mr. Bhambhani address discovery.
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             THE COURT: Counsel.
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             I don't see Mr. Bhambhani on the line.
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            MR. BHAMBHANI: I'm trying to unmute.
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            MR. GROSSENBACHER: There you go.
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             THE COURT:
                        There you are.
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            MR. BHAMBHANI: Okay. Is that better? Can you hear
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   me, Your Honor?
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             THE COURT: Yes, I can. Thank you.
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             MR. BHAMBHANI: Good morning, Your Honor.
                                                        This is
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    Sanjay Bhambhani from the Department of Justice.
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             Just to clarify a point that Mr. Deck made, the
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    billion dollars reference, the total amount that TRICARE paid
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    for all of PCCA's ingredients, what we've alleged in the
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    complaint, and we focused our complaint on ten ingredients,
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    and we focused on two of those ingredients, Fluticasone and
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   Resveratrol, but that's the total amount that TRICARE ended up
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1 It goes to essentially refute the notion that the paying. 2 government did not -- or TRICARE did not pay for these 3 ingredients. It paid a lot of money. 4 In terms of where we go from here, Your Honor, Your 5 Honor did ask for a revised scheduling order. We have had 6 discussions with PCCA. We've submitted that revised 7 scheduling order. I think we've agreed in terms of the number 8 of depositions, that we are on 30 each, at least that's what we've proposed. 10 There are certain lines of inquiry that we've laid 11 out as to what the government thinks it needs in terms of 12 discovery, and also the defendants of PCCA has also identified 13 what it claims it needs for its discovery. And so I think 14 we're prepared to go forward. 15 We have proposed initial disclosures for July 1st, 16 and so we're ready to proceed on the assumption that the Court 17 denies the motion to dismiss. 18 THE COURT: One second. Let me go to my docket 19 sheet. So, yes, I see on June 10th I received a proposed 20 scheduling order and so we have not entered that. We need to 21 do so. 22 MR. BHAMBHANI: That is correct. 23 THE COURT: And that proposed scheduling order is 24 agreed to by PCCA, is that correct?

MR. BURBA: Your Honor, based on Your Honor's minute

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order, we are agreeing with this schedule now.

We did want to raise for the Court the point that, you know, under the False Claims Act the government has immense investigatory powers and used those for a period of about eight years in this case.

The majority of the discovery we expect to take will likely require *Touhy* requests and cooperation from the government, and so we are concerned that the shorter discovery period may not allow us to sufficiently go through that process, depose the witnesses we need to depose, and request and receive the documents that we are going to need.

I don't know that we have any relief we'd request from the Court at this point other than to ask that the Court keep an open mind and just recognize that in the event that discovery does slow down, you know, out of just fairness, given the government's eight-year investigation, we think reasonable extensions of discovery may be necessary.

THE COURT: No, that's understood.

Now, to the government, I mean, you-all have been investigating for quite a period of time. I mean, I don't see why there's any reason why you can't turn over most of your documents in some kind of a format that you-all can agree to for any discovery platform to review. I'm sure it's going to be voluminous, and so I can't understand why there would be a problem by the government production.

1 And then with regard to witnesses, Mr. Deck, or I'm 2 not sure who is in charge of that, witnesses, do we have to 3 actually go through the Touhy framework? I mean, you know who 4 the individuals are that you need to present. 5 Who wants to respond to that? Mr. Bhambhani or 6 Mr. Deck? 7 MR. BHAMBHANI: Your Honor, as to whether or not Touhy applies, it's my understanding, but I need to confirm 8 this, that Touhy applies when the government is a nonparty, 10 but --11 THE COURT: Well, you're not quite a nonparty here. 12 You are a beneficiary. 13 MR. BHAMBHANI: No, no. That's right. So I'm not 14 sure that the Touhy process is necessarily - is necessary, 15 because the government obviously is a party in this case. 16 And, of course, we will make every effort to try to 17 comply with the discovery request here. I mean, that goes 18 without saying, Your Honor. We'll make every effort to 19 cooperate, of course, reserving our right to object to what we 20 consider to be unreasonable requests that might be overbroad, 21 unduly burdensome, et cetera. 22 THE COURT: So I understand that, but when we are 23 talking about a billion dollars too and the proportionality 24 analysis, that's quite a large amount in controversy. 25 MR. BHAMBHANI: Again, Your Honor, I do want to make

1 clear, that is not what we are claiming as the amount of 2 damages. 3 That was the amount that TRICARE ended up paying, and 4 we're focusing on a much narrower subset of claims. And we're 5 focusing on -- and that's what we've tried to do in our 6 complaint, focusing on the ten ingredients that had the most 7 egregious AWP spreads. So we're not going after every single 8 item or claim. 9 And we've also identified, in terms of the examples, 10 claims that were between \$2,000 and above. It's not every 11 ingredient. 12 THE COURT: Yeah. So let's try to — if that's going 13 to be your contention here how you are going forward, let's 14 just make that clear so discovery is limited to those issues. 15 And then while you-all are talking we all know what to focus 16 in on the numbers regarding those issues. 17 I'll just wait for the inevitable discovery fights. 18 Hopefully, they will be minimal. And if you-all -- either 19 side needs more time, I'm willing to work with you on a 20 scheduling order, but this is an old case, so we're going to 21 move it forward. 22 Anything else from the government/relators? 23 MR. DECK: No, I don't think so. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 Anything else from PCCA?

1 MR. BURBA: Your Honor, I know that we're proceeding 2 under an assumption related to the motion to dismiss. I would 3 beg the Court's indulgence to address just a few of the points 4 that Mr. Deck made and also ask a question about a point that 5 Mr. Bhambhani just made. 6 THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 7 MR. BURBA: So first is the government's position 8 then that they are limiting their claim for damages to the ten ingredients listed in the complaint? 10 THE COURT: That's a good question, because is it ten 11 or two? 12 Who wants to answer? 13 MR. BHAMBHANI: Your Honor, we focused on the ten 14 ingredients. We've identified ten ingredients, and those 15 ingredients themselves involve — would produce overpayments 16 of, you know, over \$100 million. 17 Now, Your Honor, again, we're not talking about every 18 single ingredient but we are willing to focus our complaint 19 and we have limited our complaint to the ten ingredients. 20 And I'd also like to add, Your Honor, this case is a 21 TRICARE case. It's not Medicare, Medicaid, VA, or anything 22 like that. We have limited our case to TRICARE. And I just 23 want to make that point very clear. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. So ten ingredients, TRICARE. 25 What else do you got, Mr. Burba?

MR. BURBA: Well, I would note for Your Honor that the reason it's only a TRICARE case is that Medicare and other federal health programs took action upon the adoption of Didado [phonetic] to avoid this exact issue, because it was known to the government, but —

THE COURT: Let me stop you there. So, you know, I understand that point, but right now, procedurally, I'm just dealing with a motion to dismiss. So you may or may not have a point on other issues for summary judgment, but I'm just dealing with a motion to dismiss.

MR. BURBA: Understood.

And in that vein, Your Honor, I would say two points are worth making. The first is that — I'm sorry, three points in response to the three points Mr. Deck made.

The first is the allegation that we knew that the customers were submitting claims, I'm not sure that that's really relevant to the argument that we've made in our motion to dismiss.

I mean, even if our client is assumed to have known the TRICARE claims were being submitted, there was no guidance in the market as to how they should set their AWP. The exhibits to the complaint, which I'm sure Your Honor has reviewed, show that at least, according to those emails, PCCA thought that the conduct was legal because there had been no quidance or effort from the government to give clarity.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Burba, let me stop you there. I mean, isn't there some kind of reasonableness standard that applies here? I mean, a thousand percent charge markup? MR. BURBA: Well, but I think, that's only if you --I mean, if Your Honor looks to the acquisition cost as the government suggests, then that may be the case, but I don't think the government has given Your Honor any legal basis for that.

In fact, if you look at the First Circuit case and the *In Re* case from Mississippi, one of the key differences in those cases was that AWP was not the actual measure being used by the government. It was estimated acquisition cost for which AWP was standing in.

And so those courts were looking at this in a very different setting, where, you know, estimated acquisition costs was really the term that they were looking at, and so it made more sense.

Here, there was no such guidance by TRICARE, despite the fact that as the testimony we submitted as Exhibit B shows, they knew that this was an undefined term allowing for manufacturers to set AWP at whatever they wanted as far back as 2002.

But we would take the position that if you review the exhibits, which the Court is allowed to do, and interpret on

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its own in a motion to dismiss because they are the documents 2 the government attached, what you ultimately see is that the 3 standard by which we set our AWPs was our competitors, and 4 what we saw going on in the market, which we believe is reasonable commercial activity in the absence of any other quidance by the government.

Now, the government has pointed to a settlement by one of our competitors, but that was well after the events that occurred here. It was a no-fault settlement, no liability acknowledged. So it's not clear why that would be relevant to the time that we were operating in.

We were a commercial actor who did no business with the government, who were selling to customers who had a direct relationship with the government, and were responding to market factors that were created by the knowing conduct of the government, and we don't believe that the government should get the benefit of the doubt, or a pass, on the fact that it created the environment in which these AWPs were determined.

THE COURT: But what you are neglecting to say, though, and what's alleged in the complaint, is that your client was telling these pharmacies, "Don't tell TRICARE the real price that you guys are paying, and if they ask, talk to us first," and so you are omitting all of that from the allegations.

MR. BURBA: Well, and I would point out, if you look

at those Zaccarrian [verbatim] emails, I don't think that's what they say, because what they say is the government was already receiving -- and I'm not looking at it right now but I know that this is generally what they say -- what they say is that the government is receiving the invoices as part of the claim, but which contains the information the government has pleaded that they were required to submit which included pricing information and the acquisition cost.

And then there was another document which I believe was the claim where the AWP was listed.

But I mean, while those documents suggest that we were telling them not to put the two numbers next to each other, they also show clearly that the two numbers were still going to the government with the claims.

I would also point out, if you look at the GAO report, the GAO report indicates that TRICARE was running its own medical facilities and that those medical facilities were purchasing these ingredients for use in compound medications.

So TRICARE was a customer of either PCCA or one of its competitors and was well aware, as a customer, of what the acquisition costs were. And this is not asking the Court to assume facts outside the complaint. This is asking the Court to look at the record in front of it, which the government has not objected to the Court looking at —

THE COURT: But aren't you asking me to make fact

determinations at this pleading stage? I mean, it seems like you are making motion for summary judgment arguments.

MR. BURBA: With all due respect, Your Honor, I don't believe that I am.

I mean, you are required to consider the government's allegations as true, and you are required to give them fair inferences, but I don't think fair inferences involve or prohibit the Court from looking at inconsistencies between the allegations made in the complaint and questioning whether those inconsistencies and apparent, you know, factual — factually incorrect information based on the GAO report is false.

You know, I would note the government has not objected to the Court considering those GAO reports and actually argued that the Court use them in support of its argument. They are the government's own document prepared at the direction of Congress. So I think those are perfectly appropriate for the Court to consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the allegations.

You know, I would point to one final factor, which is the Court is required to give credence to and draw inferences for the government, but, you know, the government investigated this case for eight years. Like eight years.

And they had eight years to write this complaint and come up with their best — put their best foot forward for the

1 Court. And they submitted an exhibit, Exhibit 28, that has 2 eight clear errors showing that claims were paid in 1900. 3 Now, we have not been given the TRICARE data relevant 4 here, but it draws into question for us the accuracy of the 5 government's information. 6 I understand that sounds like a summary judgment 7 argument, but my point here is if the government attaches the 8 documents, the Court can rely on the documents and a fair interpretation of those documents at the summary -- I'm 10 sorry — at the motion to dismiss stage, and that's what we're 11 asking the Court to do. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 I'll take the motion to dismiss under advisement. 14 could very well change my mind, and this is not a ruling, but 15 you-all ought to act under the assumption this case is going 16 forward. 17 To me, a lot of this seems to be disputed fact issues 18 that are appropriate for a summary judgment, but I'm keeping 19 an open mind. I'm going to revisit the motion to dismiss in 20 light of the arguments and I'll try to get an order out as 21 soon as I can. 22 Anything else from the government/relators that we 23 need to take up today? 24 MR. DECK: No, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Anything else from the defendant?

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MR. BURBA: No, Your Honor. And thank you for your
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    time and attention today.
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             THE COURT: Thank you.
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             We're in recess until 1:30.
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        (Concludes proceedings)
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        I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
   the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. I
 8
    further certify that the transcript fees and format comply
   with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference
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